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Abstract 
Slotting fees are fixed charges paid by food manufacturers to retailers for access to the retail 
market. This note considers this practice in the context of multi-product markets with imperfectly 
competitive retailers, a monopoly supplier of one good, and competitive suppliers of other goods. We 
show how the monopolist and the retailers can use bnakedQ slotting fees–charges imposed on the 
suppliers of other goods–to obtain vertically integrated monopoly profits. 
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1. Introduction 
Slotting fees, which are lump-sum payments made by food manufacturers to grocery 
retailers, are becoming increasingly common in wholesale supermarket transactions. Food 
manufacturers pay slotting fees to retailers in exchange for allocating shelf-space to new 
products as well as for maintaining existing products on retailer’s shelves (FTC, 2001). 
Recently, the practice of slotting fees has faced growing criticism by small food manufacturers, 
who claim the fees to be a flagrant form of rent extraction by large retailers (Prevor, 2000). 
The academic literature offers a number of theories to explain why and when slotting 
fees emerge, and each theory has identified various economic effects. On one side of this 
literature are theories focused principally on the charges for new product slots, or the so-
called product bintroduction fees.Q A number of scholars (e.g., Chu, 1992; Richards and 
Patterson, 2004; Lariviere and Padmanabham, 1997; Desiraju, 2001) argue that slotting 
fees serve as a signaling or screening mechanism whereby new product manufacturers, 
better informed than retailers about the likelihood of their product’s success, pay an 
upfront bond to signal its quality. Such fees can lead to a better matching between 
consumers and products and can also raise manufacturers’ incentives for post-product­
launch promotion (Chu, 1992). Others (most notably Sullivan, 1997) argue that slotting 
fees serve to price costly and limited shelf-space in a competitive market, thereby 
efficiently equating the demand and supply for product diversity. 
A competing literature–to which the present note contributes–focuses on the strategic 
use of slotting fees in imperfectly competitive markets. These theories apply generically to 
charges both for new product introductions and for the continued stocking of existing 
products through so-called bpay-to-stay fees.Q Shaffer (1991a) studies the use of slotting 
fees by duopolistic retailers who procure goods from competitive food manufacturers and 
compete in prices to sell them to consumers. He finds that a two-part tariff–a slotting fee 
combined with an elevated wholesale price–serves to commit a retailer to setting a higher 
retail price, thus reducing the extent of retail competition to the retailer’s advantage and to 
society’s loss. Hamilton (2003) considers a competitive retail sector, but duopsonistic food 
manufacturers who compete in quantities to procure inputs. The retailer–manufacturer 
contract in this setting also combines a slotting fee with an elevated wholesale price. Such 
a contract is advantageous to the manufacturer because the higher wholesale price 
implicitly precommits him to more aggressive quantity competition in the upstream market 
for the input. In contrast to Shaffer (1991a), such slotting fees are pro-competitive. 
While these strategic effects are derived in markets for a single product, we focus 
instead on the role of slotting fees when there are multiple products in the marketing chain, 
and imperfect competition in both the manufacturing and retailing sectors. In the upstream 
market, we consider two manufactured goods, one produced by a monopolist and the other 
supplied by a competitive industry. In the downstream market, duopolistic retailers sell the 
manufactured goods to consumers in a spatially differentiated, multi-product retail market. 
In this context, we derive a role for bnakedQ slotting fees–charges imposed on the 
competitive fringe by agreement between the monopoly manufacturer and retailers–which 
can be used to control the pricing of competitive producers to the advantage of the 
contracting parties.2 
2 We borrow this terminology from Rasmusen et al. (1991), who describe bnakedQ exclusionary agreements 
that, like the contracts characterized here, are transparently designed to extract rents. Throughout, we also assume 
that the contracts are bnakedQ in the sense that they are observable to all. However, in Section 4.3, we discuss 
contract enforcement issues when the terms of retailer–fringe contracts cannot be verified by the monopolist. 
The slotting fees that emerge in a multi-product retail setting are consonant with some 
anecdotal evidence on the practice. The slotting fees derived here can be asymmetric, but 
uniformly involve positive slotting fees on the fringe—even when the monopoly supplier 
pays a zero or negative fee. This is consistent with claims in the industry that large 
manufacturers do not pay slotting fees, but small manufacturers do. For example, it was 
learned from the FTC’s action blocking the Heinz-Beechnut bbaby foodQ merger that 
Gerber, the leading manufacturer of baby food, does not pay slotting fees, whereas both 
Heinz and Beechnut do. Because most U.S. retailers stock Gerber and either Heinz or 
Beechnut as a second brand, slotting fees are viewed as auction prices paid by Heinz or 
Beechnut to become a retailer’s second brand. The bnakedQ slotting fees derived here also 
are in accord with the observed consternation of bsmallQ suppliers over the imposition of 
slotting fees by retailers (FTC, 2001), as opposed to their mutual agreement in contracts 
(as in Shaffer, 1991a; Hamilton, 2003). 
This work is closely related to the literature on vertical control. Winter (1993) considers 
a similar model with a single (monopoly) product, and duopoly retailers that select prices 
and a level of bservice.Q The role of vertical contracts in this setting is to correct excessive 
retail price competition and the underprovision of service. In contrast, we introduce a 
competitive bfringeQ at the manufacturing level and examine how contracts in general–and 
slotting fees in particular–can be used by a monopolist to control the pricing of rival 
manufactured goods.3 There is also a substantial literature on the extension of monopoly 
power to other products through the use of tying arrangements in vertical contracts (e.g., 
Whinston, 1990; Carbajo et al., 1990; Shaffer, 1991b). This literature focuses on multi-
good producers who seek to extend the advantage enjoyed by a monopoly supplied good 
to a full line of products.4 In contrast, the distinct focus here is on how slotting fee 
contracts can be used to capture monopoly rents from markets for other firms’ products. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and 
discusses the centrality of multi-product marketing and retail competition to the emergence 
of positive slotting fees. Section 3 characterizes baseline outcomes, namely, the choices of 
a vertically integrated marketing chain and outcomes absent contracts. Section 4 
characterizes slotting fee contracts that achieve the integrated optimum. Section 5 
discusses policy implications, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. The model 
We consider a vertically structured marketing chain with an upstream (wholesale) 
market and a downstream (retail) market. In the upstream market, a monopolist produces 
one good (product 1) and a competitive industry (fringe) produces the other good (product 
2). Monopoly and competitive fringe production are both at constant marginal cost, c 1 and 
c 2, respectively. Upstream producers sell their goods to duopolistic retailers, and each 
3 Adding retailer service (or shelf-space) choices to the present model yields some further insights into the 
effects of slotting fees (see our discussion in Section 5); however, doing so does not qualitatively alter our results. 
4 Shaffer (1991b), for example, studies how a contract between a multi-product monopolist and a single retailer 
can be used by the monopolist to ensure that the retailer stocks the monopolist’s full line of products. 
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retailer is assumed to stock both products. The retailers subsequently compete for 
customers in the downstream market by selecting retail prices for both goods.5 
Consumers (the number of whom is normalized to equal one) have preferences over 
both retailers and products. Specifically, consumers shop at a single retail store and choose 
which store to frequent according to a preference parameter h to be discussed shortly. 
Given a retail choice, j a {1, 2}, and consumption bundle, ( y 1, y 2), a consumer obtains the 
utility: 
2 X 
uðy 1; y 2Þ �  pijyi ð1Þ 
i¼1 
where yi is the quantity of good i purchased, and pij is the price of good i at retail 
location j. 
We assume that u(d ) is increasing and concave with bounded first derivatives, and 
u12 V 0 (the goods are weak substitutes in consumption).
6 Choosing consumption 
optimally, a consumer at retailer j obtains the indirect utility, 
2 X 
1j 1 ij iu4juu4ðp ; p 2jÞ ¼  max uðy ; y 2Þ �  p y : ð2Þ 
2fy1;y g 
i¼1 
A consumer’s retail choice is based upon the preference parameter h, which represents 
the consumer’s net preference for retailer 2, and is distributed uniformily (in the population 
¯of consumers) on the support [�h, h¯]. Formally, a h-type consumer obtains the utility u*1 
if shopping at retailer 1 and u*2+ h if shopping at retailer 2. Given retail prices, consumers 
are thus partitioned according to: 
hVh4 u41; u42 Z purchase from retailer 1; 
hNh4 u41; u42 Z purchase from retailer 2; 
where h*(u*1, u*2)=u*1 �u*2. 
Absent contracts, the monopolist sets a wholesale price w 1 and the competitive fringe 
prices at cost, w 2= c 2. In what follows, we examine how equilibrium outcomes without 
contracts depart from the optimal resource allocation of an integrated marketing chain. We 
then characterize slotting fee contracts that improve the position of both the monopolist 
and the retailers by achieving the integrated outcome. 
Before studying this model, however, it is instructive to briefly consider alternative 
frameworks either (a) without retail competition, or (b) with a single product. If the 
monopoly wholesaler were faced with a monopoly retailer–or a retailer subject to an 
exogenous consumer breservation utilityQ constraint–an optimal two-part contract between 
the two firms would be straightforward: (1) a marginal cost wholesale price (w 1= c 1) under 
which the retailer maximizes the integrated profit of the marketing chain, and (2) a 
5 The two-product market that we envision may involve separate product categories (such as ready-to-eat cereal 
and breakfast bars) or a single product category (e.g., electric razors) with a monopoly differentiated product (e.g., 
Gillette) and a generic fringe. 
6 2 1 2We denote partial derivatives with subscripts, so that (for example), u12(d )=  B u(d ) /  By By . 
$ " # 
negative bslotting feeQ whereby the retailer pays the monopoly wholesaler for his share of 
profit. The latter charge is akin to a franchise fee, but inconsistent with the positive slotting 
fees of interest in this paper. This two-part (negative slotting fee) contract yields the 
integrated optimum with or without the bfringeQ good, because a monopoly retailer that 
acquires the fringe good at cost (w 2= c 2) has no incentive to depart from monopoly 
pricing. 
Alternately, suppose that we have retail competition, but only over the single (mono­
polist wholesaler) product. Then, defining p* as the integrated monopoly retail price, the 
following can be shown:7 
Observation 1. If retailers compete over a single (monopoly wholesaler) product, (a) there 
is a wholesale price, w* a (c 1, p*), such that retailers set their retail price optimally, 
p 1= p*; and (b) in a bargaining equilibrium that splits joint gains from contracting (more 
on this below), an optimal two-part contract will set w 1= w* and rebate lost monopoly 
profits (and the monopolist’s share of contracting gains) with a negative slotting fee. 
The intuition is straightforward. With marginal cost wholesale pricing (w 1= c 1), each 
retailer prices below the integrated monopoly level in an attempt to attract customers from 
her rival; hence, an above-cost wholesale price, w 1= w*, is needed to elicit optimal retail 
pricing. Absent contracts, the monopolist, who seeks to maximize his wholesale (rather 
than integrated chain) profit, generally sets a different wholesale price. Hence, the optimal 
contract obtains the integrated outcome by stipulating a different wholesale price than the 
one that maximizes the monopolist’s profit, and this requires that the monopolist be 
compensated with a negative slotting fee (i.e., a payment from retailers to the 
manufacturer). 
In sum, a negative slotting fee prevails under two circumstances: (1) when there is a 
single retailer for both goods; or (2) when two retailers compete to sell a single good. 
Hence, for contracts that implement the integrated optimum, retail competition in multiple 
products is necessary to provide a motive for the positive slotting fees observed in practice. 
3. Integrated and no contract outcomes 
Returning to our multi-product retail duopoly model, a vertically integrated monopolist 
solves the following problem: 
2 X " ! " ! " ! $ #
i i 1 2 1 2max pi � c y p ; p uP p ; p Z p 1*; p 2* ð3Þ 
2p1;p
i¼1 P
i d 1; y i iwhere y ð Þuargmax u y 2Þ �  i p y . The solution to this problem yields the 
maximum profit available in the market, P* u P( p 1*, p 2*), which we refer to throughout 
as the integrated outcome. 
7 Proofs of Observation 1 and Proposition 2 below are contained in the appendix. Note that the model 
underpinning Observation 1–retail competition in a monopoly-supplied product–is quite extensively studied in 
the literature. Absent problems of contract observability or commitment, it is well known that a two-part contract 
can support integrated outcomes (see O’Brien and Shaffer, 1992; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994). 
We first establish that simple wholesale pricing, absent contracts, cannot give rise to the 
integrated outcome, thereby motivating our study of supplier–retailer contracts.8 In doing 
so, we describe the retailer pricing incentives that are central to the design of contracts. 
Specifically, consider the choice problem of retailer 1 (R1):9 
2 X 
1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 max p1ðp ; p ; u ; w ; w 2Þu ðpi � wiÞyiðp ; p 2Þ/ðp ; p ; u Þ 
p1 ;p
P P2 
i¼1 
2 X 
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2¼ Pðp ; p 2Þ/ðp ; p ; u Þ �  ðwi � ciÞyiðp ; p 2Þ/ðp ; p ; u Þ ð4Þ 
P P 
i¼1 
where w 2= c 2, P is defined in Eq. (3), and 
1 2; u 2 ’/ðp ; p P Þu market share of R1; given R2 s pricing 
2ðand attendant consumer utility 
P 
u Þ % & 101 2 1 2¯¼ ½h¯ þ h*ðu*ðp ; p 2Þ; u Þ�=2h¯ ¼ h þ u*ðp ; p 2Þ � u Þ =2h¯: 
P P 
The first-order necessary conditions for a solution to this problem are: ' ( ' ( ) ' ( ' (*2 X iBp1 BP B/ By B/i¼ / þP � ðwi � ciÞ / þ y ¼ 0
1 1 1 1 1Bp Bp Bp Bp Bp
i¼1 
ð5Þ 
' ( ' ( ) ' ( ' (*2 XBp1 BP B/ Byi B/iiÞ¼ / þP � ðwi � c / þ y ¼ 0 
2 2 2 2 2Bp Bp Bp
i¼1 Bp Bp
ð6Þ 
where 
B/ ðBu4=BpiÞ � yiðp1; p2Þ ¼ ¼ b0: ð7Þ 
iBp 2h¯ 2h¯
The retailer’s pricing incentive departs from that of the vertically integrated chain 
for two reasons. First, higher retail prices (ceteris paribus) prompt marginal consumers 
to switch to the other retailer. This loss of store traffic is costly to the retailer, but of 
no concern to the vertically integrated chain. The second terms in (5) and (6) capture 
these effects. Second, because the retailer pays an above-cost wholesale price to the 
monopoly supplier (w 1 N c 1), whereas the vertically integrated chain faces true cost c 1, 
retail price effects on good 1 demand have a smaller impact on retailer profit than on 
vertically integrated profit. The third set of terms in expressions (5) and (6) captures these 
effects. 
8 Even if wholesale pricing could achieve the integrated optimum, contracts would be motivated by a divergence 
between the monopoly (product 1) supplier’s pricing incentives and those of the integrated marketing chain. 
9 Choices of retailer 2 are symmetric and thus omitted. 
10 The R1 market share gives the fraction of consumers with h V h*(d )=  u*1 �u*2, which takes the indicated 
form due to our premise of uniformily distributed preferences on [�h, h¯].¯ 
+ 
Following Winter’s (1993) logic, the wholesale price of good 1 can be set so that these 
two effects exactly offset one another for the good 1 retail price. That is, because w 2= c 2, 
R1 will set p 1 optimally whenever w 1 is chosen so that all but the first term in (5) vanish. 
Namely, 
P d 1Þð ÞðB/=Bp
w 1 � c 1 ¼ N0 ð8Þ ð/ðBy1=Bp1Þ þ  y1ðB/=Bp1ÞÞ 
Nevertheless, with w 1 set per Eq. (8), the last terms in (6) do not vanish when p 2 is set 
equal to its integrated optimum, p 2*. To see this, note that 
2 1 2ÞBp1ðp14; p24; u ; w ; c +P + 
2 +Bp Eq:ð8Þ 
1 1/P4½ðB/=Bp2ÞðBy =Bp1Þ � ðB/=Bp1ÞðBy =Bp2Þ� ¼ b0; ð9Þ 
/ðBy1=Bp1Þ þ  y1ðB/=Bp1Þ 
where the inequality is due to By 1 / Bp 1 b 0, B/ / Bpi b 0 (i = 1, 2), P* N 0, / N 0, and By 1 / 
Bp 2 z 0 (with u12(d ) V0). This is an intuitive result. The retailer prefers to set a lower than 
optimal price for good 2, because reducing the price of the fringe good serves to attract 
customers from the rival retailer and the opportunity cost of the reduced price on the (in-
store) demand for the substitute good 1 is smaller for the retailer than it is for the integrated 
chain (given w 1 N c 1). 
Proposition 1. Simple wholesale pricing cannot achieve the integrated optimum with 
multi-product retailing. Closed territorial division of the market can achieve the integrated 
outcome. 
With closed territories and marginal cost wholesale pricing, both departures of retailer 
incentives from those of the integrated chain evaporate. However, because consumers, not 
retailers, determine where to shop (and retailers cannot identify a consumer’s preference 
location), we assume that territorial division of the market is impossible. 
4. Contracts 
Because the integrated outcome cannot be achieved absent contracts, there is potential 
for contracts to deliver collective gains. We assume that contract terms are determined by 
bargaining, following standard approaches in the bargaining literature (see, for example, 
Macleod and Malcomson, 1995). Also, because the issue of interest here is the form that 
the joint-profit maximizing contract can take, we do not describe the precise form of the 
bargaining game. Instead, we simply assume that the game has a unique subgame perfect 
bargaining equilibrium that splits collective gains from contract implementation according 
to a known rule (as in Rubinstein, 1982; Shaked, 1987; and others).11 
11 The distribution of rents will depend on the order of play in the bargaining game, as it would in a one-shot 
game of take-it-or-leave-it contract offers. In our model, it is arguably natural to assume that the monopoly 
supplier moves first. 
" ! " ! 
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It is often the case that the joint profit-maximizing outcome can be implemented with a 
variety of contract forms. This is true here as well. For example, a bnakedQ resale price 
maintenance (RPM) contract that stipulates the first-best price pair ( p 1*, p 2*) can clearly 
achieve the first-best, with rent distributed using either (1) a suitable above-cost good-1 
wholesale price, w 1 N c 1, or (2) a negative slotting fee whereby retailers transfer rents to the 
monopoly (good 1) supplier. 
We focus only on contracts that impose positive slotting fees on the competitive 
fringe. There are a number of ways in which to think about these fees. They could be 
2 2 2charged on each unit of output f, raising the wholesale price from c to w = c + f. 
Perhaps more realistically, the fees could be combined with quantity commitments, so 
that retailers sign sets of contracts, each stipulating a quantity ( q), a fixed slotting fee 
( f = fq) and a wholesale price (w 2). Because fringe suppliers are competitive, a retailer 
can and will bid the wholesale price down to exhaust all fringe profit, w 2= c 2+ f. 
Alternately, each retailer can solicit an exclusive supply contract with a single fringe 
supplier, requiring a lump-sum slotting fee of f 2 N 0. Fringe suppliers then compete in 
wholesale prices (w 2) for exclusive access to the retailer’s market at the cost f 2. The 
retailer, in turn, selects among suppliers with the lowest prices on offer. The fixed 
slotting fee thus confronts the retailer with a wholesale price that satisfies, in 
equilibrium, the zero-profit condition of the fringe, 
2 2 1 2w 2 � c y p ; p ð Þ ¼ f 2: ð10Þ/ d
Whether the monopoly–retailer contract requires a slotting fee that is per-unit (f) or 
lump-sum ( f 2), the fees support an above-cost wholesale price, w 2 N c 2.12 An elevated 
wholesale price, in turn, can be exploited to correct the retailers’ incentives to under­
price the fringe product. For simplicity in what follows, we assume that the monopoly– 
retailer contract stipulates the lump-sum fee f 2. 
4.1. Naked asymmetric slotting fees 
We first consider a naked slotting fee contract with a freely chosen transfer between 
retailers and the monopoly (good 1) supplier. This contract consists of (1) a fringe slotting 
fee f 2; (2) a monopoly wholesale price w 1; and (3) a monopoly–retailer transfer f 1. The f 1 
transfer distributes rents according to the bargaining equilibrium. Our task is to find 
wholesale prices that yield a first-best, (w 1*, w 2*). Given these prices, there are 
corresponding contract terms that support them of the form, 
2 2 w 1 ¼ w 14 and f 2 ¼ w 24 � c y p 14; p 24 =2: ð11Þ 
Formally, we assume that there are unique solutions to the retailers’ first-order optimality 
conditions, (5) and (6), for relevant wholesale prices (w 1, w 2) and competitor practices 
12 As will be made clear in a moment, bnakedQ slotting fees serve to contract fringe supply and increase the 
rent of the monopoly supplier. However, because fringe suppliers earn zero profits with or without slotting fees, 
there is no brent extractionQ from fringe suppliers per se; rather, rents are implicitly extracted from fringe 
consumers. 
1 2 1 2(u , u ). Given retail symmetry, we thus seek a pair (w , w ) that satisfies (5) and (6) at 
1 1 2 2 2 1 2p = p *, p = p *, and u = u*( p *, p *).13 Doing so yields: 
Proposition 2. A naked slotting fee contract can support the first-best, with w1 N c1 and 
2).14f 2 N 0 (so that w2 N c 
A notable feature of this contract is that the retailers charge asymmetric slotting fees 
to the monopoly (good 1) supplier and the fringe (good 2) suppliers. Indeed, the implicit 
rent transfer in such a contract can result in a negative bfeeQ for the monopolist–a 
payment made from the retailer to the monopolist–at the same time the fringe is charged 
a positive slotting fee. This is consonant with the heuristic empirical observation that 
larger manufacturers are less likely to pay slotting fees than are smaller ones (Freeman 
and Myers, 1987; Rao and Mahi, 2003; Sullivan, 1997, note 9). Nonetheless, as we 
discuss below, such asymmetry in the retail practice–and the attendant transparency of 
the contract’s anti-competitive effect–is by no means necessary to achieve the integrated 
outcome. 
4.2. Naked symmetric slotting fees 
A symmetric slotting fee ( f = f 1= f 2) also can be used to raise the fringe good’s 
wholesale price to the desired level described above. However, such a contract in 
general cannot achieve the desired distribution of rents between the retailers and the 
monopolist.15 To support symmetric slotting fees, the monopolist’s (good 1) wholesale 
price can be used as the instrument for rent distribution, and an additional vertical restraint 
can be used to maintain the proper good 1 retail pricing incentive. The added vertical 
restraint can be either a resale price stipulation (RPM), p 1= p 1*, or a good 1 quantity 
1 1 1 2provision, y = y ( p *, p *) /2. The slotting fee controls good 2 pricing. Such a contract 
can thus control retail pricing of both goods and distribute integrated chain profits (P*) 
between the retailers and the monopolist according to the bargaining equilibrium. For 
example: 
Proposition 3. The integrated optimum can be supported by naked symmetric slotting fee 
contracts with (i) a monopoly quantity commitment (per retailer), q =y1(p1*, p2*) / 2; (ii) 
a positive slotting fee and fringe markup, f N 0 and w2 N c2; and (iii) a positive monopoly 
markup, w1 N c1. 
13 By symmetry, this wholesale price pair will also satisfy retailer 2’s optimality conditions. 
14 The Proof of Proposition 2, contained in the appendix, derives the stated inequalities, wi N ci, thus establishing 
the optimality of a positive slotting fee, f 2 N 0 by Eq. (10). 
15 In a more detailed model, the slotting fee can be tied to shelf-space and, thus, be different for the monopolist 
and the fringe. However, symmetry then restricts the slotting fee to reflect common prices of shelf-space across 
suppliers. An optimal (integrated chain) shelf-space allocation would thus tie the slotting fees charged the two 
suppliers, and prevent their use for desired rent distribution. More generally, opaqueness of a bnakedQ slotting 
fee’s effect may impose constraints on the difference in shelf-space pricing, even if asymmetric charges are 
possible; in view of such constraints, desired rent distribution will again require the use of the other instruments 
discussed above. 
4.3. A note on enforcing contracts 
The foregoing analysis has paid no attention to the enforceability of contracts. In 
particular, it may be desirable for a retailer to renege on the pledge to levy the prescribed 
slotting charges on competitive fringe products. There are three possible resolutions to this 
potential conflict. 
First, in the case of asymmetric slotting fees, the monopolist could commit to dissolve 
the retailer contract if the retailer deviates from the stipulated fringe slotting fee. To the 
extent that the retailer has any bargaining power at all (so that it obtains a positive share of 
net gains from the contract, however small), the retailer will strictly prefer contractual 
outcomes to no-contract outcomes and, hence, will not deviate. The question, however, is 
whether the monopoly can credibly make this commitment, because it is surely better off 
with small departures from the contract than with no contract at all. 
Second, assuming that the foregoing commitment is not credible, consider the case of 
symmetric slotting fees and quantity-forcing, as described in Proposition 3. In this case, 
any departures from the contractually stipulated fee for the competitive fringe can be 
contractually punished by a reduction in the slotting fee paid by the monopolist. This 
mechanism is clearly credible, and deters any retailer deviations; the monopolist can only 
be made better off (and the retailers made worse off) by a retailer’s departure from the 
contracted slotting fee. This built-in enforcement mechanism suggests an inherent 
advantage of a symmetric naked slotting fee contract (Proposition 3) vis-a`-vis its 
asymmetric counterpart (Proposition 2). 
However, both of these enforcement mechanisms presume that the monopolist can 
verify a retailer’s contract terms with fringe suppliers. In practice, such terms may not be 
verifiable and the monopolist may have to enforce the naked slotting fee by inferring 
contract violations from a retailer’s departure from integrated good 2 retail pricing (i.e., 
p 2 p p 2*). Moreover, the overtly anti-competitive nature of such cross-market price controls 
may rule them out. If so, then we are left with a third approach to contract enforcement: 
Using a combination of resale price maintenance (and/or fixed quantity), wholesale price, 
and fixed transfer contract terms, the retailers can be provided the needed incentive to set 
an optimal slotting fee for the fringe. 
Specifically, consider a game in which (1) the monopolist first signs symmetric RPM 
1 1 1*contracts with the retailers, stipulating a wholesale price (w ), retail price ( p = p ), and 
fixed transfer/slotting fee ( f1), but no cross-market (good 2) requirements; (2) retailers sign 
(or not) two-part contracts with competitive fringe suppliers; (3) retailers set retail prices; 
and (4) production and trade occur. Due to the logic of Shaffer (1991a), retailers have 
incentives to sign slotting fee contracts with fringe suppliers (in Stage 2) that yield above-
cost wholesale prices and thereby implicitly precommit them to higher good 2 retail prices 
(in Stage 3). The challenge for the monopolist is to design its good 1 contract terms so as 
to motivate its retailer to sign optimal contracts with its fringe suppliers—that is, slotting 
fees that support integrated pricing, p 2= p 2*. When the goods are substitutes (as assumed 
1* � w 1here), this can be done by offering retailers a relatively large good 1 margin, p , 
which elevates the retailers’ incentive to increase good 1 demand by raising their good 2 
retail prices ( p 2). In a companion paper (available upon request), we completely 
characterize RPM contracts that elicit optimal naked slotting fees in this way. 
5. Policy implications 
While the anti-competitive effects of bnaked slotting feesQ are clear, what is the 
alternative? If all vertical contracts are prohibited–requiring simple wholesale pricing by 
the monopolist–it is well known that double-marginalization will yield a retail price for the 
monopoly-supplied good that is above the monopoly level. Hence, vis-a`-vis no contracts, 
allowing contracts that support integrated outcomes may or may not be welfare-enhancing 
(by lowering the good 1 price, but raising the good 2 price). 
Let us suppose instead that two-part monopoly–retailer contracts are allowed–thus 
eliminating double-marginalization–but that all other restraints are prohibited, notably 
including naked slotting charges on the competitive fringe. Then, vis-a`-vis integrated 
outcomes, prices will tend to be lower. The fringe price will be lower ( p 2 b p 2*) due to 
retailers’ customer-stealing incentives (at the wholesale price c 2). Hence, the monopolist 
sets its wholesale price in view of effects in two domains: (1) integrated profit in the 
monopoly good market (favoring a wholesale price that, loosely speaking, supports a price 
close to p 1*), and (2) incentives for retailers to raise p 2 toward its integrated level. 
Consider the latter incentives. When the two goods are substitutes (as assumed here), an 
increase in p 2 raises good 1 demand and, hence, is more profitable to a retailer when his 
good 1 margin, p 1 � w 1, is higher. Moreover, the equilibrium good 1 margin rises as the 
monopolist lowers w 1, which also leads to a lower retail price p 1. In sum, by lowering its 
wholesale price, the monopolist prompts a lower retail price ( p 1 b p 1*), but raises the good 
2 retail price. This incentive effect is advantageous at the margin because the profit cost of 
a marginal deviation from integrated good 1 pricing is negligible, while the profit benefit 
of elevating p 2 toward its integrated level is strictly positive. The anti-trust implications are 
clear: Vis-a`-vis unfettered bnaked slotting feeQ contracts, a policy that proscribes the 
imposition of contracts on the competitive fringe and allows only two-part monopoly– 
retailer contracts, will be welfare-enhancing. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows how a monopolistic supplier of one good can use bnakedQ slotting 
fees–fixed charges imposed on competitive suppliers of other goods–to achieve vertically 
integrated multi-good monopoly profits in the presence of imperfectly competitive 
retailers. The anti-competitive effects of such a practice suggest that slotting fees merit 
careful scrutiny under prevailing anti-trust laws. 
A distinguishing symptom of the slotting fees characterized in this paper is that they are 
paid by bsmallQ suppliers and at the initiative of retailers.16 If this symptom prevails in 
practice, and claims to this effect are broadly and increasingly common (Gibson, 1988; 
16 Hamilton (2003) presents a model of slotting fees that, like ours, reflects imperfect competition in wholesale 
markets but, unlike ours, implies that slotting fees are paid at the initiative of suppliers, not retailers, and are pro-
competitive. The distinguishing symptom of Hamilton’s (2003) slotting fees–supplier initiation–seems to prevail 
in some cases, such as the market for bagged salads (Calvin et al., 2001). However, it is at odds with what is 
rapidly becoming a stylized fact of the slotting fee debate—consternation by small wholesalers over the undesired 
imposition of slotting fees by large retailers (see Prevor, 2000, and many others). 
" ! " ! 
Therrien, 1989; Prevor, 2000; Rao and Mahi, 2003), then the anti-competitive conclusions 
of this paper may be of practical importance. 
The analysis developed in this paper has natural generalizations. For example, retail 
outlets may not only make pricing decisions, but also allocate shelf-space.17 In this case, 
slotting fee contracts may have even more pernicious effects. Absent contracts, retailer 
shelf-space decisions tend to be pro-competitive, as the retailer’s incentive to allocate 
greater shelf-space to products with larger retailer margins provides suppliers with an 
additional deterrent to elevating wholesale prices. Nonetheless, a shelf-space allocation 
decision by retailers does not reduce incentives for naked slotting fees. Indeed, optimal 
contracts would eliminate the pro-competitive effect of retailer shelf-space decisions by 
pre-stipulating shelf-space and charging for it, ostensibly, with slotting fees. 
In addition, the analysis has treated the imperfectly competitive manufacturing sector in 
its starkest form—that of a monopoly producer with a competitive fringe. If there are, 
instead, multiple oligopolistic manufacturers, then the qualitative conclusions of the 
analysis would extend directly, provided one or more suppliers can bargain with all 
retailers. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons to expect matters to change with 
oligopoly supply. First, suppliers and retailers may only be able to bargain unilaterally 
with one another. In this case, the outcome would be a Shaffer (1991a)-type contracting 
environment with multiple products. Second, in a differentiated product market, an 
incumbent firm may enjoy dominance at present, but risk losing dominance if consumers 
become accustomed to a new rival’s product. In this case, the dominant firm has an 
incentive to deter entry even if total available market profit is higher with rival 
production.18 Slotting fees can serve such entry-deterrence purposes. However, adding 
such complications to the model does not fundamentally alter the logic of naked slotting 
fees as instruments for the monopolization of multi-product marketing chains. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Observation 1. Let y( p) denote consumer demand for the single (monopolist) 
product. Then 
p4 ¼ argmax p� c y p Z y p þ p� c ðBy p =BpÞ ¼ 0: ðA1Þ1 ð Þ ð Þ 1 ð Þ
17 Shelf-space may be a form of bservice,Q as studied by Winter (1993). However, in the short-run at least, shelf-
space is a fixed resource to be allocated between products, as opposed to a freely selected service for individual 
products or collective custom. 
18 See Bernheim and Whinston (1998) for a complete development of this point. 
" ! 
" ! 
" ! 
Retailer 1’s choice problem, given wholesale price w, is 
R max J ðp; wÞ ¼ ðp� w y p h þ h4 ; ðA2ÞÞ ð Þ ¯
p 
yielding a solution p R(w) that satisfies: 
BJRðÞ h þ h4 ðyþ ðp� wÞðBy p =BpÞÞ � ðp� wÞy y ¼ 0; ðA3Þ=Bp ¼ ¯ ð Þ
with Bh* /  Bp = �y. For simplicity, we assume that the solution to (A3), and hence, p R(w), 
is unique for relevant w. (Sufficient conditions for a unique solution are that (1 / y( p)) is¯ 
convex and (yy + h(By( p) /  Bp)) z 0 for w b p b p(w)u p: p�w = �y / (By( p) /  Bp).) By 
symmetry, the monopolist’s wholesale price choice problem is: 
M R1Þmax J ð Þ ¼ ðw� c yð w : ðA4Þw p ð ÞÞ
w 
(a) Note that, at w = p = p*, BJR( p*; p*) / Bp=(h¯ + h*)(c 1 �p*)+ h¯ (By( p)/Bp) N 0. At 
1 R 1 1w = c , BJ ( p*; c ) /  Bp = � ( p* �c )yy b 0. By the intermediate value theorem, there 
is a w* a (c 1, p*) such that BJR( p*; w*) / Bp =0, which, by symmetry and the 
uniqueness of (A3)’s solution, establishes part (a). 
(b) If the solution to (A4) is w = w*, then the integrated optimum is achieved without 
contract and no contracts will be signed. If the solution to (A4) is w p w*, then 
optimal two-part contracts stipulate w = w*. In a bargaining equilibrium, the 
monopolist receives his base no-contract profit plus a non-negative share of joint 
gains from implementation of the first-best. Hence, the fixed transfer from 
monopolist to retailers (the slotting fee f) satisfies: 
J w4 � 2f z max J w ;Mð Þ Mð Þ
w 
where the left-hand side is the monopolist’s payoff under contract and the right-hand 
side is his no-contract payoff. Hence, n o 
f Vð1=2Þ JM w4 �max JMð Þwð Þ b0; 
w 
where the second inequality is due to argmax JM(w) p w*, and revealed 
preference. 5 
Proof of Proposition 2. After some manipulation, it can be seen that the following 
1 1* 2 2*wholesale price markups will solve (5) and (6) at p = p and p = p (where BP / 
Bp 1= BP / Bp 2=0): 
ii �w c ¼ Ai =B for i ¼ 1; 2; ðA5Þ 
i i j j ¯ )�1 j 1 2where, with yj = By / Bp and /j = B/ / Bp = � (2h y ( p , p ) for (i, j) a {1, 2}, 
h i 
i iA P4/ / � / z0; j p i ðA6Þi ¼ jyi iyj 
' ( 
$ " ! # 
1 2 1 2B ¼ ð/y þ y 1/1Þð/y þ y 2/2Þ � ðy / þ y 1/2Þðy / þ y 2/1Þ1 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1¼ //½y � y � þ /½y 2/2 þ y 1/1 � y 1/2 � y 2/1�z0: ðA7Þ1y2 1y2 1y 2y 1y 2y 
The inequalities in (A6) and (A7) are due to y
i
i b 0 (for i =1, 2); /i b 0 (for i = 1, 2); with 
i s u12= u21 V0 (by assumption), yj ¼ � uij z0 (for j p i, (i, j) a {1, 2}); and, by concavity of 
u, y1
1 y2
2 �y12 y21 N 0. Provided / N 0, the inequalities in (A6) and (A7) are strict; hence, 
1 1* 2 2*
evaluating A1, A2, and B at / =1/2, p = p , and p = p yields (A5) wholesale prices, 
1* N c 1 2* N c 2w and w , that implement the integrated optimum. 5 
1 1* 2*Proof of Proposition 3. Let q = y ( p ,p ) /2 denote the optimal quantity commitment, 
assumed (for simplicity) to commit both the seller (who agrees to supply exactly q) and the 
buyer (who agrees to market exactly q). This implies the constraint (for retailer 1), 
1 1 2 2 2 2 y 1ðp ; p 2Þ/ðp ; p ; u Þ ¼ q Z p 1ðp ; u Þ: ðA8ÞP P 
Given wholesale prices and the quantity commitment, R1’s problem becomes: 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 max qðp 1ðp ; u Þ � w 1Þ þ ðp 2 � w 2Þy 2ðp 1ðp ; u Þ; p 2Þ/ðp 1ðp ; u Þ; p ; u Þ ðA9Þ 
2 P P P P p
The first order condition for R1’s optimum is: 
1Bp2 2/y 2 þ ðp 2 � w 2Þð/y þ y 2/2Þ þ ðq þ ðp 2 � w 2Þð/y þ y 2/1ÞÞ ¼ 02 1 2Bp
ðA10Þ 
where 
1 1Bp /y þ y1/2¼ � 2 : ðA11Þ
1Bp2 /y þ y1/11 
2 2* 2 2*To support the integrated optimum, we need a w = w that satisfies (A10) at p = p , 
2 1* 2* 1 1* u = u*( p ,p ), p = p (by (A8) and the definition of q) and / =1/2 (by symmetry of the 
2* 2 1* 2*equilibrium). (We assume that, for the optimal w and u = u*( p ,p ), there is a unique 
solution to Eq. (A10), which therefore uniquely solves problem (A9).) Evaluating (A10) at 
1* 2*the latter values by substituting Eq. (A11) and (from the definitions of p , p , and 
q = y 1/), 
" ! $" ! " ! #
2 2 2 2 1 1 y 2 þ p 2 � w y ¼ �  w 2 � c y þ p 1 � c y ;2 2 2 
" ! $" ! " ! #
2 2 2 2 1 1 q þ p 2 � w y / ¼ � / w 2 � c y þ p 1 � c y ;1 1 1 
we can collect terms to yield 
1 �1 2ðy / þ y 1/1Þ C � w 2 � c B ¼ 0; ðA10VÞ1
% & 
" ! " ! 
where B N 0 is defined in (A7), 
1 1C ¼ /P4 y /2 � y /1 N0; ðA12Þ1 2
and the inequalities follow from / =1/2 N 0, (A7), P* N 0, yii b 0, y
i
j z 0 (  j p i), and 
/i b 0. From (A10V) and (A12), w 2* satisfies: (w 2 � c 2)=C/B N 0, which implies that 
2 2 1* 2* 1f =(w 2 � c )y ( p , p ) / 2  N 0. The monopoly wholesale price, (w 1 � c ) N 0, is set to 
obtain the desired rent distribution, 
1 1 14 24 Mw 1 � c y p ; p ¼ 2f þ p ; ðA13Þ 
where 0 b p M b P* is the monopolist’s bargained profit. 
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